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PROPOSED REFORMS IN NORTH CAROLINA DIVORCE
LAW
PATRICIA

H.

MARSCHALL*

For many years the divorce laws in all jurisdictions were riddled with the
fault concept. The need to show fault on the part of one's spouse obviously
intensified the bitterness of the parties. It also increased the likelihood of
perjury. ' During the last ten years a revolution has occurred in divorce law,
with some twenty states either making breakdown of the marriage the sole
ground for divorce, or adding a breakdown ground to existing fault grounds. 2
There has also been a movement toward the elimination of the traditional
divorce defenses such as recrimination, 3 and a trend toward deemphasizing
fault in awarding alimony and making property divisions. 4
The earliest trend toward non-fault divorce was the adoption of separation
statutes. Kentucky made separation a ground for divorce in 1850, and at least
twenty-eight jurisdictions have followed suit.'
North Carolina adopted its first separation statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. §
50-5(4) in 1907, providing for divorce on the ground of a ten-year separation
if there were no children. 6 Despite its subsequent amendments, this statute
has never been a true non-fault statute because of the restrictive judicial
interpretation requiring that the plaintiff allege and prove that he is the injured
7
party.
In 1931 the General Assembly enacted the second separation statute, N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-6,8 under which the plaintiff could obtain a divorce without
showing that he was the injured party. 9 This was a significant step toward
eliminating fault from North Carolina divorce law. However, outmoded fault
concepts are still sufficiently pervasive to cause problems.
North Carolina also has retained traditional notions in the areas of property
and child custody. These notions, together with a continued emphasis on
fault, have created four basic problem areas: (1) the perpetuation of nonviable marriages, (2) spousal support based on fault rather than on the needs
* Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University, School of Law.
I. Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 32-35 (1966).
2. Foster and Freed, Divorce Reform: Brakes on Breakdown? 13 J. FAM. L. 443, 444-45
(1973-74) [hereinafter cited as Foster and Freed].
3. Id. at 445. The recrimination doctrine requires the court to deny a divorce where both
parties have grounds for divorce.
4. Id. at 477-482.
5. M. PLOSCOWE, H. FOSTER & D. FREED, FAMILY LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 349 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as PLOSCOWE, FOSTER, AND FREED].
6. 1 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW 293 (1963) [hereinafter cited as LEE].
7. Id. at 272.
8. Id. at 295.
9. Id. at 272; Johnson v. Johnson, 237 N. C. 383, 75 S.E. 2d 109 (1953); Reeves v. Reeves,
203 N.C. 792, 167 S.E. 129 (1932).
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and capabilities of the parties, (3) the absence of power in the divorce court
equitably to divide property, and (4) the absence of specific guidelines to the
trial court in custody decisions. These problem areas and suggested reforms
will be developed in this article.
I.

A.

THE PERPETUATION OF NON-VIABLE MARRIAGES

Analysis of the Problem

North Carolina courts have compelled couples whose marriages are no
longer viable to remain subject to the matrimonial bonds.
Imagine a wife who feels that she and her husband are seriously incompatible. She leaves him; during the next three years, the spouses have almost no
communication, and there is no hope of reconciliation. During the past year,
the wife has been involved openly with another man. She sues for divorce on
the ground of a one-year separation under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6. The
husband, in a vindictive mood, pleads and proves abandonment and adultery.
Result in North Carolina: divorce denied and an empty marriage preserved.
Of the states with separation statutes which do not require a voluntary
separation on the part of both parties, Professor Clark cites only North
Carolina as one which denies a divorce to the plaintiff who is proved to be at
fault in the separation."0 The propriety of using recrimination to defeat an
action for divorce brought under the one-year separation statute was reaffirmed as recently as 1974 in Harringtonv. Harrington." In that case, the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that the affirmative defenses of abandonment or adultery are available to the defendant to defeat an action under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-6. However, the court pointed out that a divorce a mensa et
thoro, alimony without divorce under former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16, or the
existence of a valid separation agreement, will legalize the separation, with
the result that after the passage of one year, either party will have a right to
divorce. 2 Unfortunately, the first two remedies are not available to our
hypothetical "guilty" wife, and a vindictive husband is not likely to sign a
separation agreement.
Why has the North Carolina Supreme Court clung to an outmoded fault
defense against the one-year separation statute, which is clearly a non-fault
ground for divorce? The Harringtonopinion gives us little insight. The court
relies principally on the following quotation from Byers v. Byers: 13
It is true, the statute under review provides that either party may sue
for a divorce or for a dissolution of the bonds of matrimony, 'if and
when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for two
years,' etc. (now one year). However, it is not to be supposed the
10.
11.
12.
13.

H. CLARK, JR., LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 353 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974).
Id. at 264, 210 S.E.2d at 192.
223 N. C. 85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943).
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General Assembly intends to authorize one spouse willfully or wrongfully to abandon the other for a period of two years and then reward
the faithless spouse a divorce for the wrong committed, in the face of
a plea in bar based on such wrong. . . . Out of unilateral wrongs arise
rights in favor of the wronged, but not in favor of the wrongdoer. One
who plants a domestic thornbush or thistle need not expect to gather
grapes or figs from it."4
This language, which is more colorful than helpful, apparently grounds the
recrimination doctrine in something akin to the clean hands doctrine. A
careful study of the clean hands doctrine, however, reveals that it has never
been applied automatically, but only in the discretion of the court. This
principle is well stated in the Arizona Supreme Court case of Matlow v.
Matlow: 15
To hold that any recrimination would bar a divorce would be a
degradation of marriage and a frustration of its purposes, for then the
courts would be using recrimination as a device for punishment. If the
marriage has failed and family life has ceased, the purposes of
marriage are no longer served. . . . The doctrine of recrimination,
like the doctrine of unclean hands of which it is a part, is not a
mechanical doctrine but an equitable principle to be applied to the
facts of each case and with a consideration for the interests of the
public. 16
Although not articulated in the North Carolina cases, the probable underlying reason for applying the recrimination doctrine to defeat suits under the
one-year statute probably originated in the court's desire to afford financial
protection to the wife abandoned by her husband. Prior to 1967, there could
be no award of permanent alimony upon divorce in North Carolina;' 7
therefore the husband's duty to support his wife could be preserved only by
denying divorce. A vast majority of the cases applying the recrimination
doctrine have involved suits under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 by an abandoning
husband. ' 8 Before the possibility of permanent alimony existed, there was
indeed a strong equitable argument for denying a divorce to the abandoning
husband, who was usually the supporting spouse. But that argument is now
outmoded. In fact, if the wife is the "guilty" spouse, she can suffer serious
economic hardship under the current law. If the husband can prove abandonment without justification and/or adultery on the part of the wife, he owes her
14. Harrington v. Harrington, 286 N. C. 260, 263, 210 S.E.2d 190, 192 (1974).
15. 89 Ariz. 293, 361 P.2d 648 (1961).
16. Id. at 297-98, 361 P.2d at 650.
17. 2 LEE, supra note 6, at 162; 2 LEE 48-64 (Supp. 1976).
18. Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968); Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C.
130, 125 S.E.2d 373 (1962); Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957); Johnson v.
Johnson, 237 N.C. 383, 75 S.E.2d 109 (1953); Pearce v. Pearce, 226 N.C. 307, 37 S.E.2d 904
(1946); Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945); Pharr v. Pharr, 223 N.C. 115, 25
S.E.2d 471 (1943); Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d466(1943); Briggs v. Briggs, 215 N.C.
78, 1 S.E.2d 118 (1939); Brown v. Brown, 213 N.C. 347, 196 S.E. 333 (1938).
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no duty of support even through the marriage continues. 19 But the wife is not
free to remarry, since she cannot get a divorce. If she is unlucky enough to be
without a good education or previous job experience, her chances of earning a
decent livelihood are slim.
After a careful study of the history and evolution of the recrimination
doctrine, Professor Moore concludes:
The liberalization of American divorce laws over the past few
decades is evidentally ascribable to a gradual realization that the
denial of a divorce seldom restores life to families that are sociologically dead when they enter the court. 20
This theme is echoed by Professor Lee who states:
From a purely social viewpoint it is hard to defend the rule that
recrimination is an absolute bar to the granting of a divorce for it
requires that parties who are guilty of misconduct which makes their
marriage impossible of success shall continue their impossible relationship as a sort of punishment for their mutual guilt. No court in the
land can make a couple return to their
home and live together happily
21
unless they really want to do SO.
Another serious objection to the recrimination doctrine is that it indefinitely
prevents divorce for only one class o-f people: the poor. A North Carolina
plaintiff of substantial means who is cenied a divorce because of recrimination need only migrate to a more liberal state. Assuming he or she remains in
the new jurisdiction for a reasonable period of time and accumulates the
necessary indicia of domicile, an ex parte divorce can be obtained that has a
good chance of withstanding any attack that may be made by the disgruntled
ex-spouse.
The only serious argument which can be raised against the recent trend
toward liberalized divorce laws is that "easy divorce" has a detrimental
effect on family stability. However, this does not appear to be true. The
University of Chicago's Comparative Law Research Center designed a study
to determine whether the ease with which divorces may be obtained affects
the stability of marriages. 2 2 Germany was selected as the appropriate location
for the study because significant charges had occurred in German divorce
laws during a period in which ample statistics had been kept. The researchers
concluded that the strictness or laxity of the divorce laws had an insignificant
effect on the divorce rate. The vast changes that did occur in family stability
were instead regarded as being tied to such causes as the emergence of modem
mass society and war.
Given the fact that legal preservation of a non-viable marriage serves no
socially useful purpose, what can be done in North Carolina to prevent this
19. 2 LEE, supra note 6, at 136-37.
20. Moore, Recrimination, 20 S.C.L. Rev. 685, 717 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Moore].
21. 1 LEE, supra note 6, at 337.
22. M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW 292-301 (1972).
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result? We will look first at remedies which could be effectuated either by the
legislature or the courts and second at possible legislative reform.
B.

Suggested Reforms

1. By the courts or the legislature
Since recrimination is not imposed by statute in North Carolina, the
following reforms could be undertaken by either judicial decision or
legislation.
a. Making recriminationapplicable in the court's discretion
In the leading case of DeBurgh v. DeBurgh,23 the California Supreme
Court established judicial discretion in applying recrimination. Justice
Traynor's opinion sets forth the major considerations which should govern a
court's decision when faced with a situation involving recriminatory conduct
by the plaintiff:
(.)
The prospect of reconciliation. The court should determine
whether the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed or
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be
saved. It should consider the ages and temperaments of the parties,
the length of their marriage, the seriousness and frequency of their
marital misconduct proved at the trial and the likelihood of its
recurrence, the duration and apparent finality of the separation, and
the sincerity of their efforts to overcome differences and live together
harmoniously.
(2.) The effect of the maritalconflict upon the parties.If a continuation of the marriage would constitute a serious hazard to the health of
either party, as in the case of physical brutality, the court should be
reluctant to deny divorce. Although financial considerations can play
only a minor role in determining the propriety of divorce, even these
may not be entirely ignored if the evidence indicates that marital
conflicts are destroying the livelihood of the parties.
(3.) The effect of the marital conflict upon third parties. In every
divorce case in which children are involved, their interests are of the
utmost concern to the court. The disruptive effect of divorce upon
children is to be deplored, but in a given case it may be preferable to
violence, hatred, or immorality when these are present in the home.
The community as a whole also has an interest. Adultery, desertion,
or cruelty, for example, can only discredit marriage; their perpetuation is not lightly to be decreed.
(4.) Comparativeguilt. In many ways the guilt of the parties may be
unequal-in the gravity of the misconduct involved, in the frequency
of its occurrence, or in its effect upon children and others. Moreover,
one spouse may demonstrate substantially greater repentance and
reform. Marital offenders, therefore, are not necessarily in pari
delicto before the chancellor. Their comparative guilt may have an
23. 39 Cal.2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
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important bearing
upon whether or not either one or both should be
24
granted relief.
These appear to be reasonable guidelines for a trial court, particularly the
emphasis on the prospect of reconciliation. Marriages in which there is hope
of reconciliation will be continued, and marriages which are deemed irretrievably broken will be ended legally. The fact that DeBurgh was relied on
heavily by several other jurisdictions which adopted the discretionary
25
approach attests to the basic soundness of the decision.
One problem with making the application of the recrimination doctrine
discretionary with the court is that any standard which involves an equitable
balancing of various factors will result in somewhat uneven justice due to the
varying personal predilections of judges. In North Carolina this might prove
particularly true. Some trial judges steeped in the old tradition might find it
difficult to grant divorces when faced with recriminatory conduct by the
plaintiff. However, despite this drawback, judicial discretion clearly is
preferable to an automatic application of the recrimination doctrine.
b. Adopting the doctrine of comparative rectitude
Where both parties have gounds for divorce, the doctrine of comparative
rectitude gives a divorce to the party least at fault .26 This doctrine has been
adopted by only a few jurisdictions 27 and has two serious drawbacks. First, it
unwisely continues to focus on fault, thus encouraging bitter courtroom
battles. Second, in some jurisdictions, if the parties are equally at fault, the
divorce will be denied, 28 thus leaving the door open for the legal perpetuation
of marriages which are no longer viable.
c. Making recriminationinapplicable when plaintiff seeks divorce under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6
Since the recrimination doctrine is no longer needed to protect the financial
interest of the abandoned, dependent spouse, the courts of North Carolina
could well refuse to apply recrimination against actions brought under the
one-year separation statute. There seems no reason to continue applying a
doctrine which has been criticized by various writers as: 'fundamentally
unsound,' 'logically absurd,' 'regressive and unfortunate,' 'outrageous,'
'incompatible with the interest of society in maintaining the basic family
status,' 'the unholy outgrowth from the doctrine of fault,' and '[a] good
example of the uselessness and mischievous nature of the varied family
29
legislation existing in some of our states."'
24. Id. at 872-73, 250 P.2d at 606.
25. Howay v. Howay, 74 Idaho 492, 264 P.2d 691 (1953); Burns v. Burns, 145 Mont. 1,400
P.2d 642 (1964); O'Conner v. O'Conner, 253 Ind. 295, 253 N.E.2d 250 (1969).
26. CLARK, supra note 10, at 377.
27. Professor Moore lists Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas and Utah as embracing the doctrine.
Moore; supra note 29, at 735.
28. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 230 Ark. 213, 322 S.W.2d 77 (1959).
29. Statutory note, 20 MERCER L. REV. 484, 487 (1969).
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If the courts refuse to abandon recrimination, the General Assembly could
well follow the lead of the Virginia Legislature. As in North Carolina, the
Virginia legislators added the non-fault ground of a one-year separation to the
existing fault grounds. 30 However, they went one step further and provided
that neither res judicata nor recrimination as to any other ground will bar a
suit for divorce on the ground of the one-year separation statute. 3' Since fault
of the parties is logically irrelevant to a non-fault ground for divorce, this
seems an eminently reasonable resolution of the matter.
d. Abolishing the recriminationdefense entirely
In states which have followed the recent trend toward adopting the marital
32
breakdown ground, the doctrine of recrimination has been abolished.
However, at least two states which still have fault grounds for divorce also
have abolished recrimination entirely. The Minnesota statute provides "A
decree may be adjudged to either husband or wife notwithstanding that both
have conducted themselves in such a manner as to constitute grounds for
divorce." 33 New Jersey has also statutorily abolished the recrimination
doctrine, providing that if both parties establish grounds for divorce, a decree
may be granted to each. 34
Since the recrimination doctrine has been thoroughly discredited, its
complete abolition seems preferable to the less pervasive reforms. However,
since about ninety-seven percent of the divorces obtained in North Carolina
are based on the one-year separation statute, 3 5 preventing the use of
recriminatory defenses against that statute would solve the problem as a
practical matter.
2. By the legislature
Another method of preventing the legal perpetuation of non-viable marriages would be the enactment of a true marital breakdown statute. First
36 the breakdown
adopted in California,
theory has now been adopted by some
37
twenty states.

All breakdown statutes are grounded on the notion that it serves no socially
useful purpose to perpetuate a marriage which is in fact dead. However, the
language of the statutes varies as each jurisdiction attempts to formulate a
workable definition of "breakdown."
The California statute provides for divorce if the court finds "irreconcilable differences, which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the
marriage," 38 defining such differences as "those grounds which are deter30. VA. CODE § 20-91 (1975).
31. VA. CODE § 20-91 (9) (a) (1975).
32. PLOSCOWE, FOSTER & FREED, supra note 5, at 511-12.
33. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06 (9) (West 1969).
34. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 34-7 (West 1975).
35.

1 LEE, supra note 6, at 272.

36. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4506 (West 1970).
37. Foster and Freed, supra note 2, at 451.
38. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West 1970).
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42

mined by the court to be substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage
39
This
and which make it clear that the marriage should be dissolved."
definition is clearly circular and offers no real guidance to the court. The Iowa
statute attempts to provide a clearer standard by focusing on the likelihood of
reconciliation. The ground is stated to be the "breakdown of the marriage
relationship to the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been
destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be
preserved.
As Foster and Freed point out, under either the California or Iowa model, it
is fair to say that divorce is obtainable on unilateral demand. 4 Questioning
the wisdom of a law which offers no protection against hasty divorce, they
suggest that "perhaps the best proof of breakdown is separation due to marital
difficulties, although it may be a matter of judgment as to how long a period of
separation should be required.' '42 The shortest statutory separation period
which serves as evidence of breakdown is Vermont's six months. 43
Foster and Freed note that an alternative method of proving breakdown is to
require reconciliation efforts; if these fail, a divorce is then granted.'
However, if this approach is used, the state must be committed to providing
good conciliation services-an admittedly costly procedure.
Although the adoption of the breakdown theory of divorce would seem to
preclude by implication the use of defenses such as recrimination, most states
have made their intent clear by specifically excluding the use of the common
law defenses. For example, § 303(e) of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act provides the "[p]reviously existing defenses to divorce and legal separation, including but not limited to condonation, connivance, collusion,
recrimination, insanity, and lapse of time, are abolished."
In conclusion, it is suggested that the quickest and simplest way to prevent
the legal perpetuation of marriages which are, in fact, dead would be for either
the courts or the General Assembly to declare that the recrimination doctrine
is no longer applicable to suits brought under the one-year separation statute.
However, the ideal solution would be for the General Assembly to establish a
single non-fault breakdown cause of action for divorce. This would
emphasize a commitment to non-fault principles which would have important
ramifications in other areas of divorce law, such as spousal support and
property division. In establishing the breakdown criterion, the General
Assembly should incorporate some objective test on which to base a conclusion that there is little or no hope for reconciliation. A lengthy separation
period of from six months to one year could furnish the basis for a finding of
irremediable breakdown.
"40

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at § 4507.
IowA CODE ANN. § 598.17 (West 1976).
Foster and Freed, supra note 2, at 447.
Id. at 452.

43.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 551 (1974).

44. Foster and Freed, supra note 2, at 452-53.
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II.

A.

SPOUSAL SUPPORT BASED ON FAULT .RATHER THAN ON
NEEDS OR CAPABILITIES OF THE PARTIES

Analysis of the Problem

Spousal support is based on the fault of the supporting spouse and the
innocence of the dependent spouse rather than on the needs and capabilities of
the parties. As previously mentioned, permanent spousal support upon
absolute divorce was not available in North Carolina until 1967. 4s When
permanent alimony was instituted, the General Assembly wisely provided
that the "dependent spouse," whether husband or wife, is entitled to
support. 4 The legislat-ure, however, made two serious mistakes in its
formulation of the new alimony statutes.
The first mistake was to tie the right to alimony to fault. Fault on the part of
the supporting spouse is necessary to support an alimony award. The grounds
for alimony include these acts by the supporting spouse: unnatural sex acts,
abandonment, or indignities to the person of the dependent spouse. 47 Furthermore, fault on the part of the dependent spouse can be fatal to a claim for
alimony. The statutes provide that "[a]limony or alimony pendente lite shall
not be payable when adultery is pleaded in bar. . . and the issue of adultery
",48
is found against the spouse seeking alimony...
In order to determine reasonable criteria for the award of spousal support,
agreement on its purposes is necessary. Clark suggests that alimony "prevents the wife from becoming a financial burden to the community, ...
eases the hardship of transition from marriage to single status, . . . compensates the wife for services rendered, and to some extent . . . gives tangible

form to moral judgments about the relative fault of the spouses." 49 Unfortunately, in North Carolina, the last purpose has obscured the other more
important purposes. Clark warns that "[biasing alimony awards upon fault
ignores the complexity of the causes underlying most marital disputes and
risks being guided
by nothing more substantial than prejudice or
50
sentimentality."
Stress should be placed on easing the transition from married to single life.
If one spouse has been taken out of the labor market for many years, the main
purpose of spousal support should be to provide the education or training
necessary to his or her reentry into the job market.

New Hampshire has adopted a realistic alimony statute which provides that
where there are no minor children, the alimony order shall be effective for not
more than three years. 5 1 However, the alimony order may be renewed, if
45. 2 LEE, supra note 6, at 153; 2 LEE 36-64 (Supp. 1976).
46. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1 (3) (Supp. 1975).
47. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (Supp. 1975).
48. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.6 (a) (Supp. 1975).
49. CLARK, supra note 10, at 442 (1968).
50. Id.
51. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458: 19 (1968).
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justice requires, for periods of not more than three years at a time.5 2 This
approach seems a wise compromise between the view that prohibits alimony
entirely, and the more widely prevailing view which allows alimony indefinitely, absent remarriage of the dependent spouse or death of one party.
If alimony is conceived of as transitional aid to the dependent spouse, the
fault of either spouse logically is irrelevant. 53 Even if alimony is awarded on a
permanent basis, there is a need to deemphasize fault in order to ensure that
one spouse does not suffer unfair economic consequences. As one court has
noted:
Alimony should not be a reward for virtue nor a punishment for guilt.
The element of fault should be deemphasized. Fault should not be a
bar to alimony except in cases of gross culpability, such as infidelity
or abandonment. In most cases neither party is at fault or both are in
some degree. Generally, family break-ups are not due to specific acts
of either spouse, legal fictions notwithstanding. They result rather
from general malaise to which both have contributed. Fault usually
comes after the malaise has set in; it is the symptom not the cause of
domestic discord.54
Even infidelity and abandonment need not bar alimony to a needy spouse.
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, in § 308, provides that marital
misconduct shall be disregarded in awarding maintenance. Of the ten states
that have adopted marital breakdown as the sole ground for dissolution, eight
have made fault irrelevant in awarding alimony. 55 However, of the ten states
which have superimposed a breakdown ground onto existing fault56 grounds,
only one state deems fault irrelevant to alimony determinations.
It should be noted that North Carolina is one of fourteen states which make
fault a bar to alimony; in all the rest, fault is either irrelevant or is merely one
factor to be considered by the court in making the alimony award. 57 It is time
for North Carolina to follow the trend toward deemphasizing fault in the area
of spousal support.
The second mistake made by the General Assembly in its formulation of the
right to spousal support was to prevent an order of alimony when the divorce
is obtained by the dependent spouse in an action initiated by that spouse on the
ground of separation. 5 8 This means that a dependent spouse who has no other
ground for divorce than the one-year separation statute is effectively precluded from receiving alimony unless he or she can persuade the other spouse
to institute the action. The reason for this provision is not readily apparent.
52. Id.
53. However, the New Hampshire statute gives the court discretion to consider fault as a
factor in awarding alimony. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458: 19 (6) (1968).
54. Doyle v. Doyle, 5 Misc.2d 4, 6, 158 N.Y.S.2d 909, 911-12 (1957).
55. Foster and Freed, supra note 2, at 476.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 477, n. 174.
58. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (c) (Supp. 1975).
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Perhaps the General Assembly was ambivalent about the wisdom of enacting
the one-year separation statute and included N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (c) to
discourage its use. In any event, the section clearly works an unreasonable
economic hardship on a dependent spouse who must use the one-year
separation statute as grounds for divorce.
We have seen that fault concepts pervade the North Carolina statutes
regulating spousal support and that fault has no relation to the needs of the
dependent spouse as he or she makes the transition from married to single
status. What legislative changes would provide a more realistic framework
for spousal support?
B.

Suggested Reforms
1. The North Carolina General Assembly should pass legislation providing either that fault is irrelevant in determining spousal support, or that it is
merely one factor to be considered when the court awards support.
2. Consideration should be given to replacing permanent alimony with
term alimony designed to ease the transition from married to single life.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11(c) should be repealed so that use of the
one-year statute as grounds for divorce no longer precludes the petitioner
from receiving spousal support.
III.

THE ABSENCE OF POWER IN THE DIVORCE COURT EQUITABLY
TO DIVIDE PROPERTY

A.

Analysis of the Problem
Upon divorce, the spouse with legal title to property usually keeps it, which
often results in economic injustice to one party.
The pure common law marital property system now exists in only fourteen
states, including North Carolina and the Virgin Islands.5 9 Under this system
the court simply declares ownership to be in the person who has legal title
unless a constructive trust or gift can -be established. The spouse who has
exercised predominant control over the earnings of the couple usually turns
out to be the winner in this situation.
For example, suppose the husband invested $50,000 saved from his
earnings during marriage. He put all of the investments in his name. Despite
the fact that the wife's services as a housekeeper, mother, chauffeur, and cook
have made a substantial contribution to the family, she will get no share in her
husband's savings should they divorce.
In urging some type of marital property division, Professor Rheinstein
asks:
Why should a wife working as keeper of the home and nurse of the
children be in a less favorable position than the married woman who
works outside the home, earns her own living and accumulates her
own savings? Does not the housewife through her work enable the
59.

Foster and Freed, supra note 2, at 479, n. 180.
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husband to earn money and accumulate his savings? Is she not his
partner in a joint venture and therefore entitled to participate in his
acquests?6
The working wife who spends her income on her family and lets her husband
save may be no better off than the housekeeper. In one such case the New
York courts refused to give the wife who supported the family an equitable
interest in the husband's investments made in his name. 6 1 Such a result is
obviously unfair and does not uphold the reasonable expectations of the
parties.
A marriage is a partnership, and this fact should be reflected in the way the
law treats the finances of the parties on dissolution. Recognition of the
partnership factor has been achieved in community property states by giving
each spouse title to his or her property owned before marriage or acquired by
gift or inheritance after marriage. All income earned by either spouse during
marriage is deemed community property, and on divorce it is either divided
equally, 62 or the court is given discretion to divide the community property in
an equitable manner .63 In some community property states, the court also has
64
discretion to make an equitable division of the parties' separate property.
With regard to property division, it is better to be an unmarried "meretricious spouse" in the community property state of California than to be a
legally wed North Carolina housewife. In In re Cary,6 5 a meretricious union
lasted eight years. Four children were born and a substantial amount of
property was acquired before the "spouses" separated. Deciding that a
"family" existed within the meaning of the Family Law Act, the court held
during their union could be divided
that the property acquired by the couple
66
pursuant to the dissolution statute.
In twenty-five states and the District of Columbia, the common law system
has been retained, but the courts have been given the power to divide the
parties' property equitably. 67 Clark points out that in making an equitable
division of property, some courts limit themselves to consideration of factors
having a direct bearing on equitable ownership, such as: "Whose funds were
used to purchase the property; how the property was used after it was
acquired; and whether the marriage partners had made agreements with
60. Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 413 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rheinstein].
61. Fischer v. Wirth, 38 A.D.2d 611, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1971).
62. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West 1970).
63. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-318A.
64.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.63 (Vernon 1975).

65. 34 Cal. App.3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
66. Id. at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865. A decision handed down during the publishing cycle of
this article overruled Cary by refusing to ground recovery by the "meretricious spouse" on the
Family Law Act, but says a property division can be obtained on general equitable principles as
well as on implied-in-fact or express contract theories. Marvin v. Marvin, No.LA 30520 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 27, 1976) (dictum); see 3 FAM. L. REP. 2157 (1977).
67. Foster and Freed, supra note 2, at 479.
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47

respect to the property .... -68 Other courts look to the same factors
deemed relevant in alimony determinations, including "the extent of the
husband's property, the wife's needs, the duration of the marriage, relative
responsibility for the marital breakup and other factors having nothing to do
with the equitable ownership of the property. "69
Clark expresses concern over the blurring of distinctions between property
division and alimony because methods of enforcement and rights to modification depend on the characterization. 70 It is true that parties in settlement
agreements and courts in making alimony awards and property divisions do
need to pay careful attention to labels. However, since the purpose of both
alimony and the equitable division of property is to achieve economic justice
between the parties, it seems reasonable to consider both simultaneously. At
least two states provide for alimony and an equitable division of property in
the same statutory section, 71thus indicating that the two should be considered
together.
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, in § 307, offers two alternatives
covering the disposition of property. Alternative A, to be used in common law
states, provides that "the court, without regard to marital misconduct, shall,
. . .finally equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets
belonging to either or both however and whenever acquired, and whether the
title thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or both." The court is
instructed to consider such things as the duration of the marriage, the age,
health, skills, employability, assets and liabilities of the parties and the
contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition and preservation of
the property. Alternative A of § 307 further instructs the court to consider
"the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit." The
Commissioners attempt to relate the equitable division of property to maintenance by directing the court to consider whether an apportionment of property
is in lieu of, or in addition to, maintenance.
The provisions of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act are sufficient to
deal with most problems of marital property division on divorce. However, at
least one problem would not be solved: how to handle pension problems. In
community property states, courts have been awarding wives contingent
interests in their husband's pensions based on the number of years the parties
were married out of the total years during which the pension accrued. 72 In
fact, a California attorney incurred a $100,000 malpractice verdict for failing
to consider the husband's retirement benefits in settling the client wife's
73
community property rights.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

supra note 10, at 450.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 451-52.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458: 19 (1968), UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1976).
Miser v. Miser, 475 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
Smith v. Lewis, 31 Cal. App.3d 135, 107 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1973).
CLARK,
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In common law states there is no method, at the present time, for handling
the pension problem. To require employers to keep track of ex-wives' rights
to share in pension plans if and when they accrue obviously presents
difficulties. Nor is it easy to give the wife a larger share of property or higher
alimony to compensate her for loss of pension rights, because at the time of
the award, the right is not vested, and it is uncertain what the ultimate value of
the pension will be. The best resolution of this problem may be the enactment
of legislation giving a petitioning spouse an equal share in the other spouse's
pension rights during any period of time that the petitioning spouse is not
employed. Noting that a thorough analysis of possible solutions to the pension
problem was undertaken by the English Law Commission, and that the West
German Law of 1976 attempts to deal with the problem in detail, Professor
that American legislators learn from the experiences of
Rheinstein suggests
74
countries.
other
We have seen that the pure common law marital property system now in
effect in North Carolina unreasonably favors the husband at the expense of his
homemaker wife. An appropriate reform is readily apparent.
Suggested Reform

B.

North Carolina should adopt legislation patterned on the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act, giving the court discretion to divide the parties' property on
divorce in an equitable manner. By doing this, recognition will be given to the
fact that marriage is an economic partnership. Neither spouse should be
allowed to circumvent the fact of partnership by making investments in his or
her name alone.

IV.

THE

ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC GUIDELINES TO THE TRIAL COURT
IN CUSTODY DECISIONS

A.

Analysis of the Problem

The courts are not given sufficient guidelines upon which to base child
custody determinations, resulting in decisions which are based on the
individual predilections of the judges.
North Carolina, like a vast majority of states, simply instructs the trial court
to award custody "to such person, agency, organization or institution as will,
in the opinion of the judge, best promote the interest and welfare of the
child." 75 This vague standard leaves the trial court free to do as it pleases.
In North Carolina the mother still has the edge when children are of tender
years. As recently as 1973, the North Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed the
maternal preference rule, citing Nelson for the proposition that:
74.
75.

Rheinstein, supra note 60, at 438-39.
N. C.. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (a) (Supp. 1975).
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If she is a fit and proper person to have custody of the children, other
things being equal, the mother should be given their custody, in order
that the children may not only receive her attention, care, supervision
and kindly advice, but also may have the advantage and benefit of a
mother's love and devotion for which there is no substitute. A
mother's care and influence is regarded as particularly important for
children of tender age and girls of even more mature years.76
At the time the maternal preference doctrine arose, the mother usually
stayed home and cared for small children. Thus, it was reasonable to assume
that she was closer to the children, and they therefore should be placed in her
custody. Today both parents often work, and the care of small children is
likely to be distributed more equally between them. To prefer the mother as
custodian prevents the court from looking closely at the parent-child relationships to determine who has the deepest relationship of trust and affection with
the child, i.e., who is the "psychological parent." If only one parent is
classifiable as a psychological parent, failure to give custody to that parent
77
can have a detrimental effect on the child.
The easiest way to eradicate the maternal preference doctrine would be for
the General Assembly to pass a statute providing that neither parent has a
prima facie right to custody; rather both have equal claims 78 The courts
should hold that the application of the tender years doctrine deprives a father
of his right to equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment. 79
Other than the maternal preference doctrine, what criteria for custody
determinations have been emphasized by the North Carolina courts? In many
cases, it is difficult to tell what the trial court considered crucial. The appellate
court often states that the custody question is one addressed to the discretion
of the trial court and declines to review the evidence in detail.8 0 However, it is
clear that North Carolina judges are often swayed by the child's wishes if he is
of sufficient age to give meaningful testimony. 81 This emphasis on the child's
desires probably reflects an attempt to place the child with the parent to whom
he feels closest. The danger in letting the child be the decision maker is that
children may select custodians for wrong reasons, such as attempting to reach
76. Spence v. Durham, 283 N. C. 671,687, 198 S.E.2d 537, 547 (1973), rev'g 16 N. C. App.
372, 191 S.E.2d 908 (1972).

77. Marschall and Gatz, The Custody Decision Process, Toward New Roles for Parentsand
the State, 7 N. C. CEN. L.J. 50, 55 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Marschall and Gatz].
78. Examples of such statutes which are becoming numerous are: N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70
(1964); Wis. STAT. § 247.24 (3) (Supp. 1976-77).

79.

State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 285 (Family Court, City of New York, New

York County, 1973).

80.

Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N. C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).

81.

Lennon v. Lennon, 252 N. C. 659, 114 S.E.2d 571 (1960); Gafford v. Phelps, 235 N. C.

218, 69 S.E.2d 313 (1952). It should be noted that any attempt by the trial judge to talk to a child in
chambers without giving the parties the right to be present and rebut the evidence will be
considered error. In re Gibbons, 245 N. C. 24, 95 S.E.2d 85 (1956).
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parent by selecting him or her, selecting the more lenient
the more withdrawn
82
parent, etc.

North Carolina courts have not overreacted to parental faults such as
adultery. Although such conduct will be considered by the court in determining the best interest of the child, the court will not punish a parent by
withholding custody.83 This approach seems reasonable. The adultery of a
parent is not relevant to the welfare of the child, unless it in some way
adversely affects the child. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act speaks to
this problem by stating, in § 402, that "[t]he court shall not consider conduct
of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child."
The three criteria just discussed: (1) the maternal preference, (2) the child's
wishes, and (3) the parties' moral conduct have received the most attention by
North Carolina courts. However, a court occasionally will place emphasis on
discipline of the child, 84 the apparent depth of affection between the8 6parent
and child, 85 or the desirability of the child's physical environment.
With regard to modification of child custody decrees, North Carolina
appellate courts correctly have stressed continuity of care and frequently have
overruled changes ordered by the trial courts. Where the trial court failed to
make a finding of fact regarding changed conditions before modifying the
custody decree, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed.87
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11.2, enacted in 1973, states that custody may be
modified only on a showing of a substantialchange in conditions. Even where
conditions changed due to the custodian-mother's overnight visits from the
man she later married, the state supreme court emphasized the good aspects of
the mother-child relationship. It concluded that the evidence was insufficient
of the
to show a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare
88
order.
modification
court's
trial
the
justify
to
sufficient
children
The cases indicate that the North Carolina appellate courts are carrying out
the legislative intent to avoid modification of custody in the absence of a
substantial change in conditions which makes modification in the best interest
of the child. However, to further decrease the frequency of modification
orders by trial courts, it might be wise for the General Assembly to adopt the
language of § 409 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. Subsection (a)
provides that motions to change custody orders may not be made within two
years from the date entered unless the petitioner supplies affidavits that the
child's present environment may endanger seriously his physical, mental,
moral or emotional health. Subsection (b) provides that custody will not be
changed unless:
82. Marschall and Gatz, supra note 77, at 55-56.
83. In re McCraw Children, 3 N. C. App. 390, 165 S.E.2d 1 (1969).
84. In re Gibbons, 245 N. C. 24, 95 S.E.2d 85 (1956).
85. Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N. C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974).
86. Lennon v. Lennon, 252 N. C. 659, 114 S.E.2d 571 (1960).
87. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 273 N. C. 71, 159 S.E.2d 357 (1968).
88. Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N. C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974).
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(1) the custodian agrees to the modification;
(2) the child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner with
consent of the custodian; or
(3) the child's present environment endangers seriously his physical,
mental, moral, or emotional health, and the harm likely to be caused is
outweighed by its advantages to him.
With regard to the initial custody decision, the open-ended best interest test
seems insufficient. What guidance can the General Assembly give to the trial
courts in this area?
B.

Suggested Reforms

North Carolina should adopt a custody statute which details the criteria to
be considered by trial judges in making custody decisions. Michigan has done
this in its Child Custody Act of 1970.89 The court is told to consider the
following factors in determining the best interests of the child:
(a) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the
competing parties and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to give the child
love, affection and guidance, and continuation of the educating and
raising of the child in its religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to provide the
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu of medical care,
and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home.
(f) The moral fitness of the competing parties.
(g) The mental and physical health of the competing parties.
(h) The home, school and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) Any other factor considered90 by the court to be relevant to a
particular child custody dispute.
This comprehensive list of factors insures that all relevant matters are
considered by the trial court. The statute says nothing, however, about the
weight to be accorded each factor. The capacity to feed and clothe the child
could be weighed equally with the depth of affection in the parent-child
relationship, even though the latter is more crucial. It might be wise for the
legislature to single out those factors which should be stressed. For example,
the statute might provide that the greatest weight shall be given to the depth of
the parent-child emotional ties, the continuity in the care of the child, and
89. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.21 et seq., (Supp. 1976-77).
90. Id. at § 772.23.
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the reasonable preference of an older child. These factors, which point toward
more emphasis than
protecting the psychological welfare of the child, deserve
9
do those concerned with his material well being. '
CONCLUSION

The current divorce law in North Carolina does not allow all dead
marriages to be dissolved. Nor does it enable the parties dissolving marriages
to avoid undue fighting and bitterness. Emphasis on fault aggravates existing
problems and encourages hypocrisy and even perjury. It is time for the courts
and the legislature to act.
The most pressing need is for a true non-fault ground for divorce. One
option is to join the trend toward adopting marriage breakdown as the sole
ground for divorce. Another alternative is to eliminate recrimination as a
defense to the one-year statute, thereby turning it into a true non-fault statute.
Alimony should not be considered a permanent bonus to the "innocent"
spouse, but rather a means for easing the dependent spouse's transition from
married to single status. The General Assembly should replace permanent
alimony with term alimony and should provide that fault is irrelevant in
determining spousal support. Use of the one-year statute should not preclude
the plaintiff from claiming alimony as the dependent spouse.
North Carolina should join the majority of states which provide for
distribution of property upon divorce. Approaching the problem as one of
equitably dissolving a partnership, fault of the parties should be deemed
irrelevant.
Recognizing that child custody problems are extremely difficult to resolve,
the General Assembly should provide trial courts with more guidance than is
now furnished by the open-ended "best interest of the child" test. It is
suggested that the Michigan Child Custody Act of 197092 offers a good model
by setting forth in detail all of the major criteria relevant to the custody
determination.
A thorough reform of North Carolina divorce law would encompass many
changes not discussed in this article. However, it is believed that the reforms
suggested here would provide a basic framework for a civilized and equitable
procedure for dissolving marriages.
91.
92.

Marschall and Gatz, supra note 77, at 55 and 60.
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.21 et. seq., (Supp. 1976-1977).
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